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Abstract—  The  paper  applies  a  non-parametric 
propensity  score  matching  approach  to  evaluate  the 
effects of two types of farm programs (agri-environment 
(AE)  programs  and  the  less  favoured  area  (LFA) 
scheme)  on  input  use  and  farm  output  of  individual 
farms in Germany. The analysis reveals a positive and 
significant treatment effect of the LFA scheme for farm 
sales and the area under cultivation. Participants in AE 
schemes  are  found  to  significantly  increase  the  area 
under cultivation (in particular grassland), resulting in a 
decrease  of  livestock  densities.  Furthermore, 
participation in AE programs significantly reduced the 
purchase  of  farm  chemicals  (fertilizer,  pesticide).  We 
also find substantial differences in the treatment effect 
between  individual  farms  (heterogeneous  treatment 
effects).  Farms  which  can  generate  the  largest  benefit 
from the program are most likely to participate. 
Keywords—  evaluation,  farm  programs,  propensity 
score matching 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The impact of government programs on agricultural 
output and farm structure is a key policy issues in the 
ongoing  international  trade  negotiations  on 
agriculture. Fostered by the fact that more and more 
data  become  available  on  a  micro  (individual  farm) 
level, recent years have seen a substantial growth in 
the number of empirical studies on the consequences 
of farm policies for individual farms [1, 2], as well as 
for  different  regions  [3,  4].  This  literature  mainly 
focuses on the consequences of policy measures for 
farm  exit  rates,  farm  output  and  growth  as  well  as 
adjustments in on-farm and off-farm labour markets. 
Despite the fact that these topics now rank high on the 
agenda of economists and policy makers, Ahearn et al. 
[3, p. 1182] conclude that ‘our understanding of how 
government  policies  have  affected  the  structure  of 
agriculture, or how future policies could be designed 
to promote specific outcomes remains limited.’ 
In  practice,  policy  interventions  turn  out  to  be 
difficult to evaluate. Government programs frequently 
have different objectives, and each program often uses 
a  large  set  of  diverse  instruments  to  accommodate 
these goals. Further more, policy measures not only 
impact individual farmers directly but also can trigger 
indirect effects through a variety of mechanisms [5]. 
Given  the  very  complex  effects  and  interactions, 
economic theory often provides only limited guidance 
with  respect  to  the  ‘correct’  specification  of  an 
econometric model. 
Participation  in  farm  programs  typically  is 
voluntary. An individual farmer will participate only if 
the  additional  benefits  exceed  the  costs  of 
participation.  Costs  and  benefits  will  differ  between 
individuals depending on specific characteristics of the 
farm  as  well  as  the  farm  family,  some  of  which, 
however, may not fully be observed. We should not 
expect  to  find  the  response  to  farm  programs  to  be 
homogenous across individual farms. The existence of 
systematic  differences  between  program  participants 
and non-participants requires separation of the ‘true’ 
effect of program participation (‘causal effect’) from 
the effect of initial differences in characteristics of the 
two groups (‘selection effect’). To distinguish between 
the  two  effects,  an  evaluator  has  to  answer  the 
question:  ‘How  much  did  farms  participating  in  the 
program benefit compared to what they would have 
experienced  without  participating  in  the  program?’ 
The  fact  that  this  counterfactual  situation  cannot  be 
observed  constitutes  the  ‘classical  evaluation 
problem’. 
The  present  paper  applies  a  non-parametric 
propensity  score  matching  approach  to  evaluate  the 
effects  of  two  types  of  farm  programs  (agri-
environmental  programs  and  the  less  favoured  area 
scheme)  for  individual  farms  in  Germany.  The 
matching  approach  is  widely  used  when  evaluating 
labour  market  policies  [6].  According  to  our   2 
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knowledge,  Lynch  et  al.  [7]  is  the  only  application 
evaluating  agricultural  policy  measures.  The  key 
advantage  of  matching  (over  standard  regression 
methods) is that it is less demanding with respect to 
the  modelling  assumptions.  Specifically,  matching 
does not require functional form assumptions for the 
outcome equation (it is non-parametric) and individual 
effect heterogeneity in the population is permitted. By 
applying  a  matching  estimator,  we  thus  hope  to 
mitigate  some  of  the  difficulties  of  evaluating  the 
effects  of  farm  policies  mentioned  above.  Note, 
however, that the aim of this analysis is not to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a policy in terms of the degree to 
which a policy objective has been realized. Instead, we 
follow previous studies and assess the effects of policy 
measures with respect to input use (land, labour, farm 
chemicals) and farm output (sales). 
II. THE AGRI-ENVIRONMENT AND LESS 
FAVOURED AREA PROGRAM 
Agri-environment programs (AE-programs) and the 
less favoured area scheme (LFA) account for 57 % of 
total public expenditures for rural development in the 
EU.  Both  measures  are  directly  targeted  to  farm 
enterprises.  
The average proportion of total farmland classified 
as LFA is 55 % in the EU-15. In Finland, Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Greece more than 70 % of the 
farmed land were classified as LFAs in 2003, while 
the  share  of  LFAs  is  zero  in  The  Netherlands  and 
Denmark [8]. Support for naturally less-favoured areas 
in Germany is available on 50 % of farmland. Farms 
located  in  designated  LFAs  are  eligible for  support. 
The  core  objective  of  the  LFA  scheme  is  the 
maintenance of the agricultural land use within these 
regions  [9].  The  share  of  granted  farmland  on  total 
farmland is highest in the southern part of Germany, 
followed by western and eastern states. LFA support 
has  little relevance  in the  north  of  Germany  due  to 
superior natural conditions for agricultural production.  
The  EU’s  AE  programs  were  introduced  as 
‘Accompanying  Measures’  of  the  1992  Mac  Sharry 
Reform  of  the  CAP.  Farmers  receive  compensation 
payments  for  the  adoption  of  environmentally 
favourable  production  technologies.  Participation  in 
the  programs  is  voluntary  and  varies  significantly 
between  EU  member  states  as  well  as  between 
different  regions  within  member  states.  While  more 
than two thirds of the total agricultural area is covered 
by  at  least  one  AE  program  in  Austria,  Finland, 
Sweden, and Luxemburg, the average share is around 
25 % in Germany [10]. Similar to the LFA scheme, 
participation in AE programs is very high in the South 
(70 % of total farm land), moderate in the West and 
East  (20 %)  and  marginal  in  the  North  (5 %)  of 
Germany. Support for reduced inputs on grassland and 
arable land and organic farming account for the largest 
share of AE expenditures in Germany [11]. 
III. ESTIMATION METHOD AND DATA  
A. Evaluation problem and matching 
Evaluation  studies  attempt  to  estimate  the  mean 
effect of participating in a program (treatment). This 
requires making an inference about the outcome that 
would have been observed for the treated (‘treatment 
group’) if they had not been treated (‘control group’). 
The key advantage of experimental studies (over non-
experimental  methods)  is  the  ability  to  generate  a 
control  group  that  has  the  same  distribution  of 
characteristics as the treatment group. In this case, the 
treatment effect can be calculated as the difference of 
mean outcomes. In non-experimental studies, subjects 
usually self-select into treatment groups. Treated and 
controls differ with respect to their participation status 
but  also  with  respect  to  many  other  characteristics. 
Calculating  the treatment effect as  the  difference  of 
mean outcomes between the two groups would yield 
biased results (selection bias). 
Matching  is  a  widely  used  non-experimental 
method of evaluation that can be used to estimate the 
average  effect  of  a  particular  program  [6,  12].  This 
method  compares  the  outcomes  of  program 
participants  with  those  of  matched  non-participants, 
where matches are chosen on the basis of similarity in 
observed characteristics. Suppose there are two groups 
of  farmers  indexed  by  participation  status  P  =  0/1, 
where 1 (0) indicates farms that did (not) participate in 
a program. Denote by 
1
i Y  the outcome (performance 
of  farm)  conditional  on  participation  (P = 1) and  by   3 
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0
i Y   the  outcome  conditional  on  non-participation 
(P = 0). 
The most common evaluation parameter of interest 
is the mean impact of treatment on the treated,  
( ) 1
0 1 = - = i i i P Y Y E ATT  
          ( ) ( ) 1 1
0 1 = - = = i i i i P Y E P Y E ,        (1) 
which answers the following question: ‘How much did 
farms participating in the program benefit compared to 
what  they  would  have  experienced  without 
participating  in  the  program?’  Data  on  ) 1 (
1 = P Y E i  
are  available  from  the  program  participants.  An 
evaluator’s ‘classic problem’ is to find  ) 1 (
0 = P Y E i , 
since data on non-participants enables one to identify 
) 0 (
0 = P Y E i  only.  
The solution advanced by Rubin [13] is based on 
the  assumption  that  given  a  set  of  observable 
covariates X, potential (non-treatment) outcomes are 
independent  of  the  participation  status  (conditional 
independence assumption-CIA):  X i i P Y ^
0 . Hence, 
after adjusting for observable differences, the mean of 
the potential outcome is the same for P = 1 and P = 0 
( ) , 0 ( ) , 1 (
0 0 X X = = = P Y E P Y E i i ). This permits the 
use  of  matched  non-participating  farms  to  measure 
how  the  group  of  participating  farms  would  have 
performed, had they not participated. 
This procedure assumes that after conditioning on a 
set  of  observable  characteristics,  outcomes  are 
conditionally  mean  independent  of  program 
participation.  Heckman  et  al.  [14]  stress  that,  for  a 
variety of reasons, there may be systematic differences 
between  participant  and  non-participant  outcomes, 
even  after  conditioning  on  observables.  Such 
differences  may  occur,  for  example,  because  of 
program selectivity on unmeasured characteristics or 
because  of  level  differences  in  outcomes 
)) 1 ( (
0 1 = - i i i P Y Y E   that  might  arise  when 
participants  and  non-participants  reside  in  different 
regions.  To  improve  the  results  of  the  matching 
procedure,  the  authors  suggest  a  conditional 
difference-in-difference  matching  estimator  (d-i-d). 
Let t represent a time period after the program start 
date  and  t’  a  time  period  before  the  program.  The 
conditional  d-i-d  estimator  compares  the  conditional 
before-after  outcomes  of  program  participants  with 
those of non-participants: 





1 = - - = - = i it it i it it P Y Y E P Y Y ATT . (2) 
The d-i-d is attractive because, unlike conventional 
matching estimators, it permits selection to be based 
on potential program outcomes at time t’ and allows 
for selection on unobservables [15]. 
Instead of conditioning on X, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
[16]  suggest  conditioning  on  a  propensity  score 
(‘propensity score matching’). The propensity score is 
defined as the probability of participation for farm i 
given  a  set  i x X =   of  farm  characteristics 
( ) ( ) i x X X = = º 1 Pr i P p .  In  the  present  context 
with  multiple  treatments  (AE  programs  and  LFA 
scheme), the propensity scores are derived from two 
logit models where participation in the AE and LFA 
program serve as endogenous variables. The estimated 
propensity  scores  are  then  used  to  construct  the 
comparison  groups.  A  Greedy  algorithm  employing 
calliper  pair  (1:1)  matching  without  replacement  is 
applied [17]. 
B. Data and definition of variables 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set 
(‘LAND-Data’)  of  more  than  32,000  bookkeeping 
farms  in  Germany  for  the  period  2000  to  2005.
1 
‘LAND-Data’  provides  information  on  farm 
characteristics and on the participation in the AE and 
LFA  program.  Roughly  one  third  of  the  32,000 
observations had to be eliminated due to missing data. 
To evaluate the effect of programme participation with 
the conditional d-i-d estimator, we focus only on those 
farms, which did not participate in the program in the 
initial time period (2000). The selection of data and 
the  definition  of  the  participation  variables  are 
described  in  Table  1  (for  additional  information  on 
variable definition and data source see Table A1 in the 
appendix). 
The  basis  for  the  empirical  analysis  (propensity 
score difference-in-difference matching estimator) of 
AE  programs  are  those  21,556  farms  that  did  not 
participate in the base year 2000. From those farms, 
9,138 farms (42.4 %) continually 
                                                            
1 The sample is not representative for Germany as large-scale and 
full-time farm enterprises are over represented.   4 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Criteria and Program Participation 
  AE programs  LFA scheme 
Total number of farms with continuous records from 2000 to 2005              32,503 
Omitted due to missing observations for some variables  10,390  8,594 
Number of remaining farms  22,113  23,909 
Program Participation in base year (2000)  557  9,695 
Non-participation in base year (2000)   21,556  14,214 
Continuous program participation (2001 – 2005): 
PAE=1 for farms continually participate in an AE program from 2001 until 2005  
(for five years) 
PLFA=1 for farms which continually participate in the LFA scheme starting from  







Program participation in some years only (excluded from analysis): 
Farms with participation to AE program (for less than five years) 






Continuous non-participation (2001 – 2005):  
PAE=0 for farms with non-participation in AE programs 








participate in AE programs during the following five-
year  period  from  2001  until  2005  (PAE  =  1).  The 
dummy variable PAE is set to zero for the 7,195 farms 
(33.4 %)  that  never  participate  in  AE  programs 
between 2001 and 2005. Those 5,223 farms (24.2 %) 
that participate in some years only, are excluded from 
the empirical analysis. 
The participation in the LFA program is defined in 
a similar way. In the initial period 2000, 14,214 farms 
did not participate in the LFA program. In the case of 
the  LFA  program,  the  number  of  farms  continually 
participating  in  the  program  in  all  five  years  (from 
2001 until 2005) but not in the base year 2000 is very 
small (only 109 farms). Since this number is too small 
to carry out a matching analysis, we have chosen a less 
restrictive  classification  criterion  in  this  case.  The 
dummy variable PLFA is set to one for those farms (502 
or 3.5 %), which participate in the program from 2001, 
2002 or 2003 until 2005 (for at least for three years). 
The  majority  of  farms  (13,075  or  92.0 %)  never 
participate  in  the  LFA  scheme  (PLFA  =  0).  The 
remaining 637 farms, which participate in a few years 
only, are eliminated from the empirical analysis. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Propensity Scores and Matching 
Conditional probabilities for participation in AE and 
LFA programs are computed by estimating two logit 
models.  Table  A2  in  the  appendix  reports  the 
parameter  estimates for  both  models,  the results  are 
only briefly discussed here. The estimated models are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level or better, as 
measured by the likelihood ratio test. The empirical 
model  for  the  AE  program  (LFA  scheme)  correctly 
classifies  87.8 %  (96.6 %)  of  all  observations.  From 
the  parameter  estimates  of  the  logit  models,  the 
propensity  score  b ˆ '
i x   is  calculated  for  every  farm, 
which  is  then  used  for  the  matching  analysis. 
Matching  is  considered  successful  when  significant 
differences of covariates among participants and non-
participants are removed. Table 2 reports unadjusted 
and  adjusted  mean  differences  of  covariates  among 
participants  and  non-participants  of  AE  and  LFA 
programs, in the pre-treatment year (2000). 
 
   5 
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Table 2: Mean comparison of selected variables (Frequencies for Dummies) in the pre-treatment year 2000 
    Agri-Environmental Programs          Less Favoured Area Program 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)   












Ln farm sales (1000 Euro)  4.781  4.783  4.776    4.742  4.807  4.783   
Ln on-farm labour (FTE)  0.365  0.307  0.363    0.427  0.326  0.464   
Ln off-farm labour (FTE)  1.080  1.118  1,083    0.723  1.159  0.740   
Ln area under cultivation (ha)  4.053  3.932  4.039    3.955  3.941  3.971   
Ln share of grassland (%)  3.066  2.920  3.047    2.850  2.304  2.783   
Ln share of rented land (%)  3.792  3.698  3.798    3.745  3.712  3.749   
Ln cattle livestock units (LU)  0.728  0.850  0.737    0.787  0.866  0.812   
Ln cattle livestock density (LU)  2.301  2.349  2.319    2.521  2.414  2.493   
Ln farm sales (1000 Euro per ha)  3.247  3.135  3.227    2.995  2.553  2.926   
Ln farm capital (1000 Euro per ha)  0.489  0.545  0.494    0.511  0.474  0.501   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  -2.522  -2.443  -2.532    -2.925  -2.409  -2.641   
Ln pesticide expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  -2.970  -2.952  -2.992    -2.640  -2.617  -2.871   
Dummy North Germany  593  2,970  541    6  4,865  5   
Dummy West Germany  711  3,545  751    108  4,313  108   
Dummy South Germany  451  581  463    334  3,718  337   
Dummy East Germany  52  95  52    4  179  2   
Number of observations  1,807  7,195  1,807    452  13,075  452   
Notes: Bold numbers indicate significantly different means between potential treatments and potential controls in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 % 
level. 
Prior to the matching analysis, farms participating 
in AE and LFA programs significantly differ from 
non-participants  with  respect  to  nearly  all 
characteristics  shown  in  Table  2.  A  comparison 
between  columns  (1)  and  (2)  ((4)  and  (5) 
respectively)  indicates  that  farms  enrolled  in  AE 
(LFA)  programs  are  characterized  by  a  higher 
amount  of  on-farm  labour,  for  example.  These 
differences in farm characteristics between program 
participants  and  non-participants  are  significantly 
different from zero.  
Columns  (3)  and  (6)  report  the  means  of  the 
relevant  variables  for  the  control  group  after  the 
matching  procedure  has  been  applied.  From  the 
9,138 (502) farms with participation in AE (LFA) 
programs, 1,807 (452) were matched to farms with 
no participation but similar propensity scores. The 
differences to  columns  (1)  and (4) are  now  much 
smaller and in no case significantly different from 
zero at the 5 % level. We can thus conclude that all 
differences  in  means  between  treatments  and 
controls have been removed through matching in the 
initial period 2000 (before program participation). 
B. Treatment Effects 
The average effect of the participation in AE and 
LFA  programs  is  estimated  by  comparing  the 
changes  in  individual  outcomes  (farm 














i i i Y Y Y - = D )  between  2000 
and 2005 (d-i-d analysis). The impact of treatment 
on  the  treated  (‘causal  effect’  of  program 
participation)  is  estimated  by  computing  mean 























ATT .      (3) 
A positive (negative) value of ATT suggests that 
farms with participation in AE and/or LFA programs 
have higher (lower) growth rates of variable Y than 
non-participants. Table 3 displays mean growth rates 
for the treatment and control group as well as the 
difference between both (the ATT).   6 
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The  d-i-d  estimator  suggests  a  significant  and 
positive causal impact of program participation on 
farm sales. During the period of investigation (from 
2000 until 2005) sales of farms participating in AE 
programs have been growing by 7.3 %, while non-
participants report a positive growth rate in sales of 
4.8 % on average. The difference (ATT = 2.5 %) is 
different from zero at the 10 % level of significance. 
The slight positive effect of AE programs on farm 
sales  is  surprising  insofar  as  participation  in  this 
program  requires  the  adoption  of  less  intensive 
production  methods  which  could  be  expected  to 
reduce  farm  output  and  thus  farm  sales,  ceteris 
paribus. No such adjustment in production methods 
is  required  for  participation  in  the  LFA  program. 
Consistently,  we  observe  that  the  causal  effect  of 
program participation in the LFA program is much 
stronger.  Sales  of  non-participants  have  been 
growing by 5.6 % on average during the period from 
2000  until  2005,  while  the  growth  rate  of 
participating  farms  is  14.4 %  on  average.  The 
average  treatment  effect  on  the  treated 
(ATT = 8.8 %) is significantly different from zero at 
the 1 % level. Where does this significant increase 
in farm sales come from? 
 
 
Table 3 Average treatment effect (ATT) of the treated for the AE and LFA programs (2000 to 2005) 
  Treatments  Controls  ATT  t-value 
  [1]  [2]  = [1] - [2]  (Significance) 
Agri-Environmental Programs           
Ln farm sales (1000 Euro)  0.073  0.048  0.025  1.72  (*) 
Ln on-farm labour (FTE)  0.007  -0.012  0.019  1.95  (*) 
Ln off-farm labour (FTE)  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.55   
Ln area under cultivation (ha)  0.077  0.042  0.035  5.32  (***) 
Ln share of grassland (%)  -0.046  -0.098  0.052  3.13  (***) 
Ln share of rented land (%)  0.004  -0.018  0.022  1.52   
Ln cattle livestock units (LU)  -0.187  -0.187  0.001  0.03   
Ln cattle livestock density (LU)  -0.108  -0.048  -0.060  -3.30  (***) 
Ln farm sales (1000 Euro per ha)  -0.004  0.006  -0.010  -0.70   
Ln farm capital (1000 Euro per ha)  0.035  0.047  -0.012  -0.79   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  0.037  0.131  -0.094  -4.57  (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  -0.025  0.022  -0.047  -1.97  (**) 
Less Favoured Area Program           
Ln farm sales (1000 Euro)  0.144  0.056  0.088  2.96  (***) 
Ln on-farm labour (FTE)  0.001  -0.012  0.013  0.83   
Ln off-farm labour (FTE)  -0.008  0.000  -0.008  -1.11   
Ln area under cultivation (ha)  0.114  0.060  0.054  3.64  (**) 
Ln share of grassland (%)  -0.041  -0.048  0.007  0.28   
Ln share of rented land (%)  0.043  0.011  0.032  1.06   
Ln cattle livestock units (LU)  -0.102  -0.147  0.046  1.09   
Ln cattle livestock density (LU)  -0.095  -0.088  -0.007  -0.26   
Ln farm sales (1000 Euro per ha)  0.030  -0.004  0.034  1.17   
Ln farm capital (1000 Euro per ha)  0.000  -0.011  0.011  0.34   
Ln fertilizer expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  0.132  0.169  -0.037  -0.91   
Ln pesticide expenditures (1000 Euro per ha)  -0.012  0.037  -0.049  -0.92   
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test at 1 % (***), 5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  7 
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Results  in  Table  3  suggest  that  the  increase  in 
farm sales is paralleled by an increase in the area 
under  cultivation.  These  results  comply  with 
findings of Key et al. [18]. Average growth rates of 
the area under cultivation differ significantly among 
program participants and non-participants. Whereas 
the  area  under cultivation  for  non-participants  has 
been growing by 4.2 %, participants report a growth 
rate  of  7.7 %  on  average.  The  average  treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) of 3.5 % is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 % level. 
Higher  farmland  growth  rates  of  participants in 
AE  programs  can  be  explained  by  the  adjustment 
process  of  farms  induced  by  program  eligibility 
criteria.  Farms  with  participation  to  certain  AE 
programs  (low  input  grassland  management,  for 
example) are, among others, required not to exceed 
a certain cattle livestock density (livestock units per 
forage  area).  In  order  to  meet  these  criteria,  farm 
operators  predominantly  choose  to  expand  the 
forage  area,  while  total  cattle  livestock  units  per 
farm are kept stable. Results in Table 3 illustrate this 
adjustment process. The number of cattle livestock 
units  is  not  affected  by  programme  participation 
(ATT = 0 %).  The  cattle  livestock  density  is,  on 
average, reduced by 10.8 % in farms with program 
participation  compared  to  a  decrease  of  4.8 %  in 
farms with non-participation. The ATT with respect 
to  the  cattle  livestock  density  is  -6 %  and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
The causal effect of the LFA scheme on farmland 
growth  is  of  similar  magnitude  as  for  the  AE 
programs. Scheme participation increases growth in 
the  area  under  cultivation  from  6.0 %  to  11.4 % 
(ATT  =  5.4 %).  No  significant  causal  effect  is 
observed  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  cattle 
livestock units or density. For the LFA scheme, the 
changes in farmland are very similar in magnitude to 
the figures reported for farm sales. Given the fact 
that  LFA  payments  are  granted  on  a  per-acreage 
base, the increase of farmed land eligible for LFA 
payments  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  strategy  to 
maximize benefits from participation. 
Table 3 does not suggest a significant treatment 
effect  of  AE  programs  on  productivity  (sales  per 
hectare).  This  result  corresponds  to  [1]  who  also 
observe  an  insignificant  productivity  effect  of 
participation  for  ten  different  farm  programs  in 
Austria. The same holds for the capital endowment 
on farms with program participation, which does not 
change significantly compared to the control group.  
An  important  objective  of  agri-environmental 
policy in Germany is the maintenance of grassland. 
Land  eligible  for  AE support  is  mainly  grassland, 
whereas both, arable land and grassland are eligible 
for  LFA  support.  Neither  AE  nor  LFA  support 
resulted in an increase of the share of grassland in 
farms with program participation. We find that the 
share  of  grassland  decreases  significantly  less  in 
farms participating in AE programs (-4.6 %) than in 
those with non-participation (-9.8 %). The ATT of 
5.2 % is significantly different from zero. The effect 
of  the  LFA  program  on  the  share  of  grassland  is 
almost zero. We conclude that current AE programs 
slow down the decrease of grassland while they are 
not able to stop or reverse this process. 
Participants  in  the  AE  program  are  required  to 
reduce  or  abandon  the  use  of  fertilizers  and 
pesticides,  while  no  such eligibility  criteria  are in 
place for the LFA scheme. Consequently, the causal 
effect  of  program  participation  with  respect  to 
expenditures for fertilizer and pesticides per hectare 
differs remarkably between the two programs. The 
ATT of -9.4 % (fertilizers) and -4.7 % (pesticides) 
indicate that farms participating in AE significantly 
reduced the purchase of farm chemicals compared to 
the control group. No significant treatment effect is 
observed  for  the  LFA  program  with  respect  to 
expenditures for farm chemicals. 
C. Heterogeneity of Effects 
It is plausible to expect that the treatment effect 
increases with the probability of participation in the 
program;  that  is,  farmers  who  can  generate  the 
largest benefit from the program are most likely to 
participate. To  check  these  hypotheses,  we  follow 
the  approach  suggested  in  Lechner  [19].  The 
expectation of the outcome variable conditional on 
the  conditional  selection  probability  (p(X))  in  the 
pool of participants and non-participants is shown in 
Figure 1.    8 
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Fig. 1 Nonparametric regression of the conditional participation probabilities (p(X)) on selected outcome variable for the AE 
programs 
Remarks: Nadaraya-Watson estimate using a Gaussian kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The solid (dotted) line represents the outcome variable for 
participants (non-participants) in AE programs.
The  comparison  is  based  on  kernel-
smoothed  regressions  for  program  participants  in 
AE  programs  (solid  line)  versus  non-participants 
(dotted line).  
Figure  1  clearly  supports  the  idea  of 
heterogeneous treatment effects. The causal effect of 
the farm program, which is the difference between 
the  two  curves  at  any  point,  fluctuates  over  the 
support of participation probabilities. The outcomes 
for  the  program  participants  are  higher  for  farm 
sales  and  the  share  of  grassland;  and  lower  for 
fertilizer expenditures at (almost) all points, which is 
consistent with the average treatment effect of AE 
programs  for  these  variables  reported  in  Table  3. 
Similar  results  we  observe  for  the  LFA  programs 
[20]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
Evaluating the effects of farm programs is a key 
policy issue. An empirical evaluation of the effects 
of  farm  programs,  however,  faces  a  number  of 
challenges:  First,  economic  theory  often  provides 
limited  guidance  with  respect  to  the  appropriate 
specification  of  an  econometric  model.  Second, 
farms  self-select  into  program  participation; 
participants  and  non-participants  thus  differ 
significantly  in  important  characteristics  (selection 
bias). Third, factors that determine the selection into 
the program and/or influence outcome variables may 
not  fully  be  observed  (unobserved  heterogeneity). 
Finally,  the  response  to  policies  will  not  be 
homogenous across individual farms (heterogeneity 
in response). 
The  present  paper  addresses  these  issues  by 
applying  a  non-parametric  propensity  score 
matching  approach  (difference-in-difference 
estimator).  The  method  turns  out  to  be  a  useful 
technique  for  the  empirical  evaluation  of  farm 
programs. Specifically, we investigate the effects of 
two  farm  programs  –  agri-environment  (AE) 
programs and the less favoured area (LFA) scheme 
–  with  respect  to  input  use  and  farm  output  in 
Germany for the period 2000 to 2005. 
The  analysis  reveals  a  positive  and  significant 
treatment effect of the LFA program on farm sales. 
The increase in farm sales observed is paralleled by 
an increase in the area under cultivation. Since LFA 
payments  are  granted  on  a  per-acreage  basis,  an 
increase in land eligible for support seems to be a 
reasonable  strategy  to  maximize  benefits  from 
participation. We also observe a significant positive 
effect  of  the  AE  program  on  the  area  under 
cultivation.  The  increase  in  farm  size  can  be 
explained by the need to reduce livestock densities 
(livestock units per forage area) in order to become 
eligible  for  AE  payments.  Compared  to  non-
participation,  AE  participants  significantly  reduce 
expenditures  for  farm  chemicals  (fertilizer, 
pesticides).  The  share  of  grassland  per  farm 
continues to decrease in farms with participation in   9 
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AE programs, although at a lower rate than in farms 
with  non-participation.  We  observe  substantial 
differences in the treatment effects between farms 
(heterogeneous treatment effects). Farmers who can 
generate  the  largest  benefit  from  the  program  are 
most likely to participate.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Variable definition and data sources 
Variables  Unit  Year  Source 
Participation in AE programs   0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Participation in the LFA scheme  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
       
Farm characteristics       
Area under cultivation  ha  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Farm sales  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Share of grassland  %  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Share of rented land  %  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
On-farm labour units 
(1 LU = 2720 working hours per year) 
LU  2000-2005 
LAND-Data 
Off-farm labour (farmer couple)  LU  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Farm income, including labour costs  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Farm capital (per ha)  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Pesticide expenditures (per ha)  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Commodity payments, livestock (per ha)  1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Commodity payments, arable (per ha)   1000 Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Livestock units (all livestock) 
(1 LSU = 1 milk cow) 
LSU  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Ruminant livestock units (only cattle, goats)  LSU  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Forage area (only grassland, fodder crops)  ha  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Livestock farm  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Pig & poultry farm  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Soil index (< 30)=very poor, 100=best)  Index  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
       
Regional characteristics       
Unemployment rate  %  2000-2005  ZAV (2005) 
Land rent (per ha)  Euro  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Land price (per sqm)  Euro  Ø 2000-2002  BBR (2004) 
Share of rural population  %  2001  BBR (2004) 
Share of farms ≤ 20 ha  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Share of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Change in the number of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha (between 1999 and 2003)  %  1999, 2003  STAT (2005) 
Gross value added in agriculture  1000 Euro  2000-2004  STAT (2005) 
Share of gross value added in agriculture  1000 Euro  2000-2004  STAT (2005) 
Gross domestic product (per capita)  1000 Euro  2000-2004  STAT (2005) 
Share of livestock farms  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Share of arable farms  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Share of pig & poultry farms  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Share of mixed farms  %  1999  STAT (2005) 
Dummy North Germany  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Dummy West Germany  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
Dummy South Germany  0=no, 1=yes  2000-2005  LAND-Data 
       
Abbreviations and Notes: ha = hectare, sqm = square meter, LU = Labour units, LSU = Livestock units. ‘Regional characteristics’ refer to the characteristics 
of the 440 administrative districts of Germany.   11 
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Table A2 Parameter estimates of logit-models explaining program participation 
  Agri-environmental Programs  Less Favoured Area Program 
Variables  Estimate  Wald Chi
2 (Sign.)  Estimate  Wald Chi
2 (Sign.) 
             
Intercept (PAE=1, PLFA=1)  -2.176  2.094    -3.677  6.438  (**) 
             
Farm characteristics             
Ln area under cultivation  1.367  4.987  (**)  1.007  54.441  (***) 
Ln area under cultivation (squared)  -0.041  0.336         
Ln share of grassland  0.367  82.946  (***)  0.306  17.668  (***) 
Ln share of rented land  0.105  9.443  (***)  -0.064  1.288   
Ln farm sales (per ha)  -0.058  0.959         
Ln off-farm labour        -0.072  8.114  (***) 
Ln farm capital (per ha)  -0.046  0.910         
Ln fertilizer expenditures (per ha)  -0.419  73.219  (***)  -0.312  10.496  (***) 
Ln pesticide expenditures (per ha)        -0.315  19.673  (***) 
Commodity payments, livestock (per ha)  1.247  5.394  (**)  0.010  12.543  (***) 
Commodity payments, arable (per ha)  0.821  5.814  (**)       
Ln livestock units (per 100 ha)  0.000  4.906  (**)  0.169  13.493  (***) 
Ln ruminant livestock units  -0.106  7.526  (***)  -0.223  20.031  (***) 
Ln ruminant livestock units (per ha forage area)  -0.118  2.075         
Ruminant livestock units ≥ 0.3 <1.4  0.566  43.543  (***)       
Livestock farm  -0.206  8.548  (***)       
Pig & poultry farm  -0.312  7.039  (***)       
Participation in the LFA scheme  0.118  2.255         
Soil index  -0.011  18.705  (***)  -0.074  136.287  (***) 
             
Regional characteristics             
Unemployment rate  0.042  8.750  (***)       
Ln farmland rent (per ha)  -0.954  69.433  (***)  -1.097  27.942  (***) 
Land price per square meter  -0.004  106.379  (***)  -0.003  13.724  (***) 
Share of rural population  -0.018  145.188  (***)       
Share of farms ≤ 20 ha  0.003  0.670         
Share of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha  0.041  32.767  (***)       
Change in the number of farms ≥ 20 < 50 ha  -0.062  20.546  (***)  -0.083  4.504  (**) 
Gross value added in agriculture  0.002  10.430  (***)       
Share of gross value added in agriculture        0.120  8.471  (***) 
Gross domestic product (per capita)  0.010  17.084  (***)  0.013  35.207  (***) 
Share of livestock farms  -0.022  105.809  (***)       
Share of arable farms        -0.024  28.685  (***) 
Share of pig & poultry farms        -0.160  117.619  (***) 
Share of mixed farms  0.047  22.385  (***)  0.297  129.552  (***) 
Dummy North Germany  -1.885  22.447  (***)       
Dummy West Germany  -1.151  4.281  (**)       
Dummy South Germany  1.326  5.303  (**)       
             
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy North Germany  0.073  0.686    -3.209  17.032  (***) 
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy West Germany  -0.153  1.497    2.918  19.839  (***) 
Ln area under cultivation*Dummy South Germany  0.654  21.170  (***)  3.484  27.243  (***) 
             
             
Number of observations    16,333      13,577   
LR chi-squared    12,288.91  (***)    1,606.55  (***) 
Pseudo R
2 rescaled    0.71      0.41   
             
% Correct prediction    87.79      96.61   
Non-Participants    90.81      99.54   
Participants    85.41      20.32   
Notes: For variable definition and abbreviation see Table A1. Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test for equality of means at 1 % (***),  
5 % (**), or 10 % (*) level.  